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1. Introduction: federalism, constitutionalism and the regulatory 
state
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the changes under way in 
the economic governance of Europe, most of the attention is rightly focused 
on the constitutional, and, perhaps, federalizing elements of the European 
Union (EU), in comparison to the type of constitutional politics and federal-
ist structures that have molded political development in America (Nicolaidis 
and Howse 2001; Menon and Schain 2006; Fabbrini 2010). This renewed 
constitutional debate ties in with the literature on comparative federalism. It 
is common to observe that some features of the American political system, 
for a long time considered exceptional, have migrated to the European Union 
(Majone 1996). According to this strand of scholarship, both the federal gov-
ernment in the USA and the European Union (EU) institutions have developed 
their core functions around regulation rather than public expenditure and 
taxation. This makes them structurally similar and different from the type 
of welfare state that emerged in the Bismarckian and Scandinavian states of 
Europe. However, this similarity in broad design principles does not mean 
that the EU and the USA have adjusted these principles to the constitution 
in a similar way.
We contribute to this lively comparative discussion of the connections 
between constitutionalism and regulation in two ways. First, we add to the 
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comparison of the federal features of the EU and the USA by focusing on 
EU day-to-day constitutional dynamics that have been overlooked, perhaps 
because of their subtle, low-politics, less visible implications and their «in-
significance» when compared to treaty revisions. Interestingly, we observe 
that many of these apparently insignificant constitutional changes under way 
have their roots in regulatory procedures. It is puzzling that whilst hundreds 
of conferences were debating the likely constitutional effects of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a quiet constitutional 
change has been under way for almost a decade, with the emergence of the 
«better regulation» or «smart regulation» agenda – a phenomenon structurally 
similar to the growth of regulatory oversight in the USA. We argue that there 
are important constitutional lessons to draw about this quiet revolution. 
Second, within the field of regulatory politics, we focus on a wave of 
reforms identified by concepts such as «better regulation» – this is the term 
often used in the EU, together with «smart regulation» (European Commis-
sion 2010) – and, in Washington, «regulatory oversight». This is a family of 
initiatives affecting rulemaking. It includes mandatory consultation, obliga-
tions to publish regulatory proposals for notice and comment, plans to reduce 
administrative obligations, the economic analysis of proposed regulation, as 
well as the creation of special-purpose oversight bodies such as the Impact 
Assessment Board in the EU and the Office for Information and Regulatory 
Affairs within the Office for Management and Budget in the USA. 
More often than not, we will draw attention to an important tool of smart 
regulation, i.e., impact assessment (IA as it is known in the EU or «regulatory 
impact assessment», RIA in the USA)1. Impact assessment is a mandatory 
administrative procedure (Renda 2006; Wiener 2006; Hahn and Tetlock 
2008; Radaelli and De Francesco 2010). Its thrust is to subject proposals for 
new rules to a process of consultation, evidence-based debate, identifica-
tion of costs and benefits (often but not exclusively via cost-benefit analysis 
principles), risks, and socio-economic effects in general, possibly in relation 
to a wide range of stakeholders and the environment. Impact assessment as 
concept covers both the process and the document prepared by the regulator 
and scrutinized by a regulatory oversight body before new rules enter the 
Federal Register in the USA or are sent as draft legislation to the European 
Parliament and the Council in the EU. Increasingly the EU version of the 
impact assessment procedure covers delegated and implementing measures 
too. By institutionalizing participatory procedures and economic tests (or a 
1 Throughout the paper will we use the term RIA to describe both the European and 
American experience. It will become clear, however, that RIA is used for rulemaking in the 
USA and for legislative proposals in the EU – the usage of impact appraisal procedures 
for rulemaking («comitology») is limited in the EU.
Rulemaking in the European Union and the United States 179
mixture of those), regulatory oversight and «better regulation» potentially 
intervene on the traditional democratic deficit that supranational and even 
federalist regulatory regimes suffer from. In this way tools like RIA directly 
touch upon the big constitutional question: who gets to decide what, and 
under which conditions?
In this article we explain the institutionalization of smart regulation 
and explore its constitutional implications, bearing in mind the fact that the 
American example has a much longer history. We also stress that we focus 
on the EU case, using the experience in the USA as contrast case. In the next 
Section we present our conceptual framework, based on socio-legal studies and 
positive political economy. We then present our findings on institutionalization 
in Section 3, whilst Section 4 is dedicated to the constitutional implications. 
Section 5 briefly concludes with an assessment of the implications of our find-
ings for comparative regulatory federalism and the regulatory state in Europe.
2. Constitution, regulation, regulatory constitutionalism, and the 
politics of structure
At the outset, we need to clarify what we mean by constitution. For our 
purposes, we need to adopt Neil Walker’s (2002) pluralist concept of consti-
tution, widely shared among socio-legal scholars, which entails that constitu-
tional politics encompasses a broad range of political relations between the 
institutions of the political system. This notion enables us to go beyond the 
American Constitution and the Treaties of the European Union. It allows us 
to also consider that constitutional politics is dynamic, based on real-world 
changing power relations. An important implication is that constitutional 
relations change when new procedures or simply ways of doing things alter 
the balance of power between an institution and the others. 
We can now enter our second key-term, that is, regulation. Rulemaking 
requirements affect among other things the delicate stage of pre-legislative 
scrutiny of policy proposals. These requirements can be manipulated by the 
President of the USA to limit agencies, or by the agencies to create constitu-
encies of support vis-à-vis the Office for Management and Budget and get 
away with more regulatory proposals. They can be used by the European 
Commission to make its proposals to the European Parliament and Council 
less easy to change, or by the Member States and the pressure groups to chal-
lenge the bureaucracy when proposals are formulated. All these are changes 
of constitutional relevance. 
Having defined the conceptual dimensions of constitutionalism and 
regulation, we have to connect the two. This is not an easy task. But during 
the last decade, a body of socio-legal literature, often blended with political 
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science, has made an effort to come to grips with the notion of regulatory 
constitutionalism (Morgan 2003; Scott 2004; Prosser 2010; Oliver et al. 2010). 
Colin Scott has put forward an approach to constitutionalism intimately 
connected to how political scientists, and particularly among them delega-
tion theorists, think of regulatory policy. Granted that constitutionalism is 
«the commitment to effectively limit the exercise of legislative and executive 
power» (Scott 2010, 17), when executive and legislative power are delegated, 
there is a need to create similar controls and limits. Since regulatory power 
is delegation politics, «from the perspective of constitutionalism, delegation 
is the central problem associated with contemporary regulatory governance» 
(Thatcher and Stone-Sweet 2002; Scott 2010, 17). The constitutional effects 
of this commitment to impose requirements on delegated regulatory power 
emerge with the routinization of mechanisms for the «promulgation of new 
regulatory rules». These mechanisms have the «potential to fundamentally 
affect the stock of constitutional controls over the exercise of power» (Scott 
2010, 24). «Accordingly» – he goes on – «one way to approach the potential 
for reconciling regulatory governance with constitutionalism is to identify 
examples where institutionalized solutions have been developed» (Scott 2010, 
25). RIA is a case in point.
To exemplify then, in her study of regulatory reform in Australia, Mor-
gan argues that cost-benefit analysis (CBA), incorporated in requirements 
for impact assessment, institutionalizes «a presumption in favor of market 
governance, and this causes bureaucrats to reform or ‘translate’ aspects of 
social welfare that previously may have been expressed in the language of need, 
vulnerability or harm into the language of market failures or market distor-
tion» (Morgan 2003, 491). Looking at the UK, Prosser (2010) finds instead 
that the regulatory enterprise is certainly concerned with economic efficiency, 
but nowadays regulators are also compelled to respect human rights (a trend 
that emerged in the US in the 1970s), solidarity, and sustainability. It is not 
just a matter of values. The new powers given across Europe to ministers to 
lift burdens and re-organize regulators have re-shaped relations between the 
core executive and the other major constitutional players. Julia Black (2007) 
has thus evidenced the centralizing effects of new regulatory reforms in the 
UK.
Let us re-cap and move forward with our conceptual framework. 
Regulatory constitutionalism concerns the limitation of power arising out of 
problems of delegation and collective action. The constitution is not only a 
set of text, but a set of political dynamics. When regulatory mechanisms alter 
the political power between an institution and the others, they have constitu-
tional effects. These effects – we add – cannot be predicted by looking at the 
design characteristics of regulatory oversight and rulemaking requirements. 
They depend on how they occur empirically, over a sufficiently long period 
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of time. «Fundamental» rulemaking obligations may become perfunctory. 
«Details» can be implemented rigorously instead.
To complete our understanding of regulatory constitutionalism from an 
empirical perspective, we need the notion of politics of structure put forward 
by Terry Moe in several publications (e.g. Moe 1989; Moe and Wilson 1994). 
Moe introduced a major difference between the design of policy and the 
design of structure. Policy revolves around concrete issues, such as housing, 
transport, and the environment. The politics of structure is about the design of 
certain procedures that shape the interaction between Congress and President 
(specifically «their capacities for exercising power»), and between bureaucra-
cies and elected politicians (a «struggle» involving «the institutions that will 
interpret, elaborate and carry out public policy: the bureaucracy»). The two 
dimensions of the politics of structure are connected, since «the struggle 
between the President and the Congress [...] while often manifested in well-
publicized battles over policy, is largely a structural matter. It is a matter of 
how each institution can engineer the structure of public bureaucracy and 
exercise control over it» (all quotes from Moe and Wilson 1994: 4). In contrast 
to policy issues, structural issues are regarded as «boring, arcane, impossible 
to understand, and irrelevant to politics» (Moe and Wilson 1994, 5). 
Yet these apparently insignificant issues of structure determine insti-
tutional power. One of the three case studies used by Moe and Wilson to 
illustrate structural politics is indeed concerned with RIA since, they argue, 
this is the procedure that stacks the deck in the relationship between principal 
and agent (McCubbins et al. 1987). Requirements such as RIA and cost-
benefit analysis do not (only) exist to deliver efficiency gains, but to tilt the 
relationship between elected politicians and regulatory officers (Pildes and 
Sunstein 1995; Posner 2001) and between Presidents and Congress (Moe 
and Wilson,1994, 42).
Before we enter our empirical analysis, a word of caution is in order. 
We do not argue that the changes triggered by the better regulation agenda 
are more important than the high constitutional politics issues that have 
dominated the discussion since the White Paper on Governance launched by 
the Commission in 2001 (European Commission 2001). Rather, we make the 
point that – no matter what their relationship with treaty-based changes is – 
they belong to the changing puzzle of constitutional change that has polarized 
the attention of the participants to the grand debate. But they deserve to be 
examined and explained on their own merits, since they are not the product of 
inter-governmental conferences and treaty revisions. The first step is to explain 
how they emerged and were institutionalized, taking into account the longer 
time period for the development of regulatory oversight in the USA and the 
shorter history of better regulation in the EU (Wiener 2006).
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3. Research design
To use this conceptual framework for comparative analysis, we have to generate 
suitable questions for the analysis of the quiet constitutional change triggered 
by procedures affecting rulemaking. 
We consider the changes affecting rulemaking (i.e., smart regulation 
initiatives) in two modes: as dependent variable and independent variable. 
Put differently, we follow two itineraries: from constitutional problems of 
delegation to regulation; and from regulation to constitutional effects. This 
way we can appraise the full circle of regulatory constitutionalism.
Concerning the sequence from constitutional politics to regulation, 
the research question is about processes of institutionalization: what are the 
mechanisms that have led from problems of constitutional politics (arising 
out of delegation) to the institutionalization of smart regulation in the two 
systems? Here smart regulation is therefore a dependent variable, and we look 
at the causes of an effect (that is, institutionalization). As for the conceptual 
journey from regulation to constitutional politics, the question is: what are 
the constitutional effects of this institutionalization? We will consider four 
types of effects: (a) on constitutional values, (b) on the relations between the 
core legislative institutions, (c) on the position of the executive and (d) on 
accountability. Here smart regulation is the independent variable, and we 
look at the effects of a cause.
We collected empirical material on both the EU and the USA. How-
ever, our original evidence (case studies, interviews, coding of impact assess-
ments) is almost entirely based on the EU, with the exception of a dozen of 
semi-structured interviews carried out in Washington. Thus, in terms of the 
specific choice of a comparative technique, this article is based on the EU 
case, contrasted for comparative purposes with the American case. This has 
implications for the level of detail we can use when we describe the American 
case. For instance, some readers may disagree with our characterization of 
the American executive as unitary, but this discussion is beyond the scope of 
this article (see Blumstein 2001; Kagan 2001; West 2006; Fabbrini 2010). In 
short, we think comparatively but this is not an explicit comparison of empiri-
cal evidence gathered evenly on two cases. Since we have research questions 
covering different and relatively long periods of time (since 1981 in the USA; 
since 2003 in the EU), it is impossible to go to the level of detail of describing 
individual episodes of rulemaking – such as individual impact assessments. 
The analysis will therefore be carried out at a macro-level, with individual 
regulations mentioned only as examples. For comparisons of relatively large 
numbers of RIAs across different political systems see Cecot et al. (2008) and 
Fritsch et al. (2012).
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4. From constitutional politics to regulation
In this section we compare the evolution of the requirement to carry out eco-
nomic analysis of proposed regulation, a requirement that both in the USA and 
the EU also implies obligations of transparency, consultation, and access to do-
cumentation. How did the initial steps to tighten control on regulatory bureau-
cracies get embedded in the rulemaking process? The explanation of institutio-
nalization outcomes is fundamental to understand the broader constitutional 
politics that originates changes – according to Moe, this is how we shed light 
on the power dimension of who gets what in creating institutions (Moe 2005).
As mentioned, in the USA the notion of smart regulation is less popular 
and more recent than the concept of regulatory oversight (Hahn and Tetlock 
2008). This focus on oversight reminds us that in Washington the evolu-
tion of administrative procedures such as impact assessment, cost-benefit 
analysis, consultation, and giving reasons obligations arose out of problems 
of delegation and oversight already partially addressed in the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946. In the course of the political development of the 
American federal executive, regulatory power was delegated to federal execu-
tive agencies of the Presidential administration, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
Federal executive agencies belong to the Presidential administration and 
together with other Presidential offices constitute the unitary executive 
(Blumstein 2001). 
There are consequences for the logic of delegation. In the case of federal 
executive agencies, delegation seeks to keep the preferences of the agencies 
in line with the Presidential preferences within a unitary executive and direct 
oversight from the Office for Management and Budget (OMB). In the case 
of independent agencies, delegation is based on the assumption that agen-
cies have preferences that differ from the preferences of elected politicians. 
This is because the act of delegation is informed by a logic of credibility of 
independent regulators – and credibility is higher if the agency is not subject 
to the vagaries of the election cycle (Majone 2001). 
The constitutional delimitation of Presidential control is therefore 
tight. Impact assessment procedures are an efficient control device in these 
circumstances. Consider the following options. The President as principal 
can limit the autonomy of federal executive agencies ex-ante (e.g., federal 
executive agencies can be saddled with political appointees) or ex-post (e.g., 
budget restrictions for agencies that do not follow the line of the White House 
or Congress). But these approaches are quite blunt and do not operate on a 
case-by-case basis, when single rules are being formulated. When individual 
regulations are made, agencies enjoy the privilege of information asymmetry, 
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since they have much more information on the regulated entities and the 
possible effects of regulations than the President (de facto represented by the 
Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs within the OMB). To limit the 
possibility that agencies in the federal Presidential administration exploit this 
asymmetry, the principal imposes an administrative requirement to publish 
for notice and comment an economic analysis of how the regulatees will be 
affected by the proposed rule. This provides information to pressure groups 
that feel damaged by agencies deviating from the preference of the President, 
represented in this process by the OMB. RIA is an administrative requirement 
that performs this function of controlling regulatory bureaucracies when they 
produce regulation. In contrast to control tools that operate either before or 
after rulemaking, RIA is an ongoing control device. 
The American RIA has emerged from the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s general rulemaking obligations via a series of executive orders, com-
mencing with Reagan’s order no. 12291. It has been used by all Presidents 
– no President has ever decided not to use it. As such, it has emerged as a 
relatively bipartisan enterprise – with some variations in terms of transpar-
ency requirements and inclusiveness of the cost-benefit analysis (Kagan 
2001). This has produced the effect – in terms of Moe’s structural politics 
– of deepening the control function of this policy instrument (the RIA) on 
agencies and integrating federal executive agencies more closely into the 
Presidential administration. This bipartisan line is evidence that the es-
sence of the instrument is structural: it is indeed about the control of the 
bureaucracy rather than specific policy goals. 
Apart from Presidents, the second source of institutionalization has come 
from judicial review by the courts, with a series of landmark judgments on 
the principles of risk regulation and cost-benefit analysis in federal executive 
agencies (Majone 2010). Taken together, courts and Presidents have drawn 
over the years a structural map of what oversight is supposed to do. Independ-
ently of fluctuations of regulatory policy preferences across administrations, 
the notion of controlling the bureaucracy has remained unchallenged.
Constitutionally, the legitimacy of control exercised by the President 
has been anchored to the fact that the imposition of RIA requirements cov-
ers only federal executive agencies. Agencies that fall outside the Presidential 
administration, such as the independent regulatory agencies active at the fed-
eral level, up until now have not been covered by the executive orders on the 
economic analysis of regulation. Further, primary legislation is not subjected 
to RIA – the justification is that Congress has enough tools (committee work, 
hearings and so on) to make informed decisions about legislation. Thus, the 
institutional territory of RIA is limited. Although there is an on-going discus-
sion on whether RIA-type requirements should go beyond this territory, for 
the time being there has not been any notable change. 
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Turning to the EU, smart regulation has emerged in a different context. 
To begin with, there are obvious differences regarding the «principal» – given 
the fusion of powers that characterizes the EU polity – a mixed polity ac-
cording to Majone (2005). In Brussels, it is difficult to find the equivalent of 
the unitary executive described by Blumstein and other American lawyers. 
True, there is an EU executive function, but it does not crystallize around 
the figure of the President of the Commission. Neither can the Commission 
as a whole be described as the executive of the EU, although it certainly has 
some executive functions. 
Second, in Europe judicial review of regulations follows a peculiar dy-
namic: the Court of Justice only marginally reviews for certain principles such 
as subsidiarity and is known to be stricter (e.g. in its application of the propor-
tionality principle) on Member State rules deemed contrary to EU law than 
on EU-level rules (Craig 2006). Hence, in the process of institutionalizing RIA 
and the gradual specification of cost-benefit analysis principles courts are cur-
rently present only in the background (Alemanno 2009). A few qualifications 
have to be made here though. There is evidence that certain design choices 
for the RIA system by the Commission have been made taking into account 
the «risk» of judicial review. For instance, although the Commission is known 
to use RIA to rally support for its proposals, it stresses the internal nature 
of RIA documents over and over again in official communications. Also, the 
situation that European citizens still do not have standing in front of the Court 
of Justice to appeal against general rules is showing the first signs of shifting 
in the future, since the Treaty of Lisbon gives individuals standing to appeal 
EU regulations that are directly applicable without implementing measures 
(art. 263 TFEU). Finally, the European Court of Justice might indirectly look 
at impact assessment in reviewing EU decisions as supporting evidence of the 
way in which the Commission exercised its discretion (Alemanno 2009). But up 
until now the situation has been quite different on the two sides of the Atlantic.
Third, whilst in the USA regulatory oversight has been grounded in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, the debate on a possible APA 
for Europe is still open (Meuwese et al. 2009). This means that the old EU 
constitutional bargain of leaving it to a central bureaucracy (the Commission) 
to make regulatory trade-offs in the «common interest» remains intact. 
Fourth, the enthusiasm for «rational» policy analysis, quantitative risk 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis is more limited in Europe (Wiener 2006). 
If anything, the Commission has instead opted for a range of regulatory deci-
sion-making principles, without endorsing cost-benefit analysis as necessarily 
preferable to others. Given this European «regulatory philosophy», it is not 
surprising that the EU RIA system operates with a preference for pluralistic 
methods, or, better, a tendency to complement «cost-benefit thinking» with 
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other decision criteria such as «coherence» or even «compatibility with the 
internal market» and «fundamental rights protection».
All this considered, how do we explain institutionalization in the EU? 
Two variables explain the outcome. One has something to do with the politics 
of delegation – in the context of institutional balance and the right of initiative 
of the Commission; the other with infra-organizational politics and learning 
in the Commission. Let us start with delegation.
Absent the Presidential control of regulatory agencies, an EU-level func-
tional equivalent of the politics of delegation we have seen at work in the USA 
is the relationship between Member States and the European Parliament, on 
the one hand, and the Commission, on the other. Acting as principal, since 
1992 the Member States, or at least some of the most active among them, 
have pressed the Commission for procedural innovations on the quality and 
quantity of legislation. The European Parliament, a relatively young institu-
tion when compared to Congress, has seized the opportunity to re-define its 
position in the lawmaking process by adding to the changes already brought 
about by the Treaties since the 1980s a plea for «better legislation» – effectively 
asking for new requirements restricting the right to initiate legislation of the 
European Commission. 
This has led to some changes at the macro level, with inter-institutional 
agreements on the quality of legislation, Council declarations and protocols 
annexed to the treaties. The Commission has reported annually on the applica-
tion of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality – gradually extended 
to Better Regulation more generally – ever since the Edinburgh Council Con-
clusions in 1992, an obligation that was formalized in Article 9 of the Protocol 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which 
the Treaty of Amsterdam added to the EC Treaty in 1997. 
But the real battle was fought at the micro-level of everyday politics 
and annual strategies on «better legislation» in the 1990s – soon to become 
«better regulation» in the next decade. At the micro level, the Commission 
experimented in the 1990s with several prototypes of better regulation tools, 
such as business impact appraisal systems, guidelines on drafting, differ-
ent approaches to consultation, and simplification of single market rules. 
The call for less and better legislation from Brussels was also connected to 
the constitutional problems of legitimacy, accountability and credibility of 
Community regulation – problems that became acute in the second half of 
the 1990s. The White Paper of the Commission on governance (European 
Commission 2001) contemplated a whole set of initiatives to address these 
problems – with better regulation tools in pole position. In 2002 the Commis-
sion adopted the first comprehensive better regulation plan and an integrated 
RIA. With modifications, the notion of appraising policy proposals via RIA 
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has remained at the core of the Commission strategy, together with initiatives 
to reduce administrative burdens at the EU level.
With RIA, the «principal», in our case the Member States, seeks to 
force the Commission to early forms of open and systematic consultation, use 
of empirical evidence, and publication of the analysis at the time a proposal 
is agreed upon by the College of Commissioners. In turn, the RIA report is 
much more analytical than the classic explanatory memoranda, being based 
on the economic analysis of various effects of proposed regulation on dif-
ferent categories of stakeholders. The preparation of the major RIAs is an 
opportunity for domestic industry and pressure groups to expose the par-
ticular categories and magnitude of costs arising out of different regulatory 
options – in principle, a good way for governments to make observations or to 
endorse the concerns of their industry. Finally, the assessments are examined 
by the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) – a control body that reports to the 
President of the Commission. The IAB returns low quality impact analyses to 
the Directorates of the Commission2 with comments on what can and should 
be improved. Although the IAB is not independent from the Commission, 
since its technical work is supported by the Secretariat General, it operates 
at arm’s-length from the daily operations of the Directorates General (DGs) 
that prepare the RIAs. 
But the lack of a unitary executive has an important implication for the way 
better regulation has been institutionalized in Brussels (Allio 2009; Radaelli and 
Meuwese 2010; Melloni 2011). The reforms of rulemaking have been refracted 
by the Commission as complex organization that does not respond to a single 
politician elected in a national constituency. For the Secretariat General of 
the Commission, RIA has provided the opportunity to consolidate strategic 
management skills (about policy initiation) and to exercise direction over the 
DGs – in the past much more autonomous in policy formulation. Since the 
Secretariat General officials are both part of the teams that build the RIA 
and custodians of its quality (directly and via the IAB), they have increased 
resources and capacity for the coordination of cross-cutting issues. Since 
2002, there has been a spectacular transformation of the Secretariat General 
units, from a focus on constitutional issues and the future of Europe to the 
specialization on better regulation. 
Apart from the incentives of the Secretariat General, the process of pre-
paring the RIAs is, at least for the major policy proposal, a matter involving 
different DGs – each of them with their constituencies and preferences. The 
activation of a plurality of DGs on the same issue has created opportunities for 
policy learning – since thanks to the RIA, the same issue is examined accord-
2 The Directorates-General or DGs are the departments of the European Commission 
that cover a specific policy area. They respond to a Commissioner.
Claudio M. Radaelli and Anne C.M. Meuwese188
ing to different perspectives. Thus, to illustrate, complex proposals such as 
the air quality strategy of the EU have been examined in their environmental, 
infrastructural, economic aspects because impact assessment has provided 
the opportunity and the resources to activate multiple interests and multiple 
sources of evidence-base. 
It is not easy to establish causality in these matters. But the process 
of preparing RIAs seems to have increased administrative capacity and the 
opportunities for joined-up mechanisms within the Commission. This goes 
hand in hand with the strengthening of the administrative role of the Com-
mission, together with other reforms that have increased coordination from 
the top. There are seeds of important changes in the roles of this important 
institution (that is, the Commission): its role as political engine of integra-
tion is in decline, but not its administrative role. In another project (Radaelli 
and Meuwese 2010), we have described this as unintended learning. We use 
the qualification «unintended» because none of the actors involved has ever 
played the RIA game with the goal of learning. The goals are to control the 
bureaucracy (for the Member States and the European Parliament), to create 
capacity for policy coordination at the centre (for the Secretariat General) 
and to defend a particular constituency (for the DGs). But (still) learning it 
is – from the organizational perspective at least.
To conclude, institutionalization has proceeded through different mecha-
nisms, i.e., the effects of delegation within the Presidential administration, 
the role of Courts, and a delimitation of the range of utilization of regulatory 
oversight in the USA; the politics of institutional balance concerning the 
bureaucratic monopoly of legislation and the internal organizational politics 
of the Commission in the EU.
5. From regulation to constitutional dimensions
In this Section we describe the effects of regulation on constitutional politics, 
looking at four categories of effects. The first category concerns the status of 
constitutional values in the debate on regulatory reform and oversight. For 
Americans the integration of the administrative state into the constitutional 
scheme has been one of the big questions of the twentieth century (Rosen-
bloom 2000a). Not so for the EU architects. 
The foundations of the Administrative Procedure Act lie in a constitu-
tional issue: «whose bureaucracy is this, anyway?» (Rosenbloom 2000b, 14). 
The major players in the game of retrofitting the administrative state to the 
constitution have been Congress, the President and the Courts (Lubbers 2006).
The Administrative Procedure Act, judicial review and Presidential 
executive orders have become the cornerstone of this game (Lubbers 2006). 
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These cornerstones are dynamic. Judicial review cannot be reduced to a single 
episode. Instead, it has produced a process of long-term learning wherein 
principles and practice of regulatory oversight and risk regulation have been 
re-defined (Majone 2010, especially Section IV). As for the Administrative 
Procedure Act, what matters in constitutional terms is not its establishment 
in 1946, but its implementation across the decades (Shapiro 1996; West 2005; 
2006). Executive orders on regulatory oversight have gradually established a 
Presidential grip on federal executive agencies, consolidating a unitary execu-
tive (Blumstein 2001). 
In essence, in the USA, the debates and the political processes of «retro-
fitting» the administrative state have been infused with constitutional values 
(Stewart 1975). These are values concerning the legitimate roles of Congress 
and the President, but also the rights of participation and representation in 
rulemaking, the proper scope of negotiated regulation, fairness in enforce-
ment (especially with reference to small business), and the constitutional 
dimension of advice and consultation, as well as the disclosure of evidence 
(Coglianese 2002) and the «regulatory right-to-know» (Rosenbloom 2000a; 
Lubbers 2006)3. 
These constitutional values were somewhat present in the emergence of 
the better regulation agenda in Europe (Mandelkern group 2001; European 
Commission 2001). However, they have been systematically played down as 
institutionalization progressed. Most likely, the Commission reasoned that the 
easiest way to get results out of this regulatory reform agenda was to promote 
its neutrality. Smart regulation, in this political strategy is not a «regulatory 
philosophy» but a «toolbox». Because having «notice and comment» type rules 
enshrined in an APA would significantly tie the Commission’s feet, it makes 
sense from an organizational perspective to emphasize the insignificance (for 
constitutional relationships, not for competitiveness outcomes) of RIA-related 
rules. In other words: how regulatory trade-offs are being made is best left to 
a form of technical management by the bureaucracy, rather than discussed in 
terms of constitutional values.
Second, the constitutional effects differ because EU impact assessment 
concerns eminently legislative proposals, and in more limited way the level of 
3 Rosenbloom (2000a, 41) rightly observes that the APA, the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act «open agency rule making to public 
participation». The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996 «takes their 
logic one step further: it requires agencies to reach out to small entities which might not 
otherwise be able to comment effectively on proposed rules or have the opportunity to 
serve on advisory and negotiating committee».
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comitology4. This explains why RIA in EU lawmaking affects the relationship 
between the Commission and the Parliament/Council, and lawmaking tout 
court. By contrast, recall that only federal executive agencies are subjected to 
RIA. Independent agencies are not covered by the executive orders on cost-
benefit analysis and oversight by the OMB. Lawmaking activity in Congress 
contemplates forms of appraisal, but nothing similar to the RIA process used 
for federal executive agencies. Impact assessment in the EU, therefore, has 
direct constitutional relevance for the relations among its key institutions. 
In fact, the EU’s better regulation initiatives have reopened the complex 
constitutional game of institutional balance with the European Parliament 
and the Council. The EU has a thin inter-institutional agreement on better 
lawmaking signed in 2003, not an APA5. In the overall constitutional picture 
the question whether the EP has the right to ask for a revision of an RIA by 
the Commission (the type of question that popped up in the long overdue 
negotiations on important regulations) shows an attempt to redraw the 
boundaries of lawmaking. In 2012 the Council on Competitiveness called on 
the Commission to involve end-users «in evaluations of regulation in order to 
identify excessive burdens, inconsistencies, obsolete and ineffective measures, 
and reduce un-necessary regulatory burdens» (Council, 6675/12; PR CO 8, 
20-21 Feb 2012). In the same period, the Council put pressure on the Com-
mission to improve on the analysis of competitiveness effects during impact 
assessment. This level of detail shows how even a type of test may signal 
shifts towards the preferences of one institution or another, thus moving the 
boundaries of institutional balance.
This brings us to the third category: the position of the executive. Within 
the unitary executive of the American constitutional system, there is scope 
for the use of RIA to «discipline and influence executive action» (Strauss et 
al. 2008, 69; see also Kagan 2001). True, as mentioned, the debate on the role 
of OIRA-OMB is heated. But there is a hint of widely shared constitutional 
wisdom in the proposition that the President has the right and the duty to use 
federal executive agencies to make executive policy. The discussion indeed is 
on the excesses or distortions of this constitutional role. 
4 Legislative initiatives are referred to as «secondary» in the EU, since the «pri-
mary» level concerns the Treaties. Following this terminology, comitology is the «tertiary» 
level.
5 The agreement is little more than a general memorandum of understanding 
when compared to the scale of the constitutional issues raised by use of better regulation 
procedures among the three main institutions of the EU. The full text of the agreement 
is available in the Official Journal of the European Union, 2003, C 321/01, 31 December 
2003, and on-line at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:200
3:321:0001:0005:EN:PDF.  
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By contrast, in the EU, characterized by shared powers in a mixed polity 
(Majone 2005), the executive cannot be reduced to a single entity, an individual. 
Hence the constitutional scope of RIA lies in the legitimacy of the Commission 
and the ongoing assertion of its exclusive right of initiative. As Strauss et al. 
put it: «For the EU, impact assessment is much more a device for legitimiz-
ing Commission choices in formulating legislative proposals and informing 
legislators than for controlling a dispersed bureaucracy, although it does play 
an important role in giving the President of the Commission more control over 
the various Directorate-Generals» (Strauss et al. 2008, 69-70. Thus, on one side 
of the Atlantic we find constitutional implications defined in explicit terms of 
influence and discipline, on the other couched in the language of legitimacy.
In turn, legitimacy is a core issue in the constitutional discussion of 
the exclusive right of initiative of the Commission: if the process is public, 
transparent, and even contestable by a large number of institutional and non-
institutional stakeholders, what are the consequences for the exclusive right 
of initiative established by the Treaty? Returning to Rosenbloom’s question 
«whose bureaucracy is this, anyway? » (Rosenbloom 2000b, 14), the unique 
construction of an exclusive right of initiative for a non-elected institution was 
designed as a safeguard to protect the general European interest. In a sense, 
it was a constitutional measure, as it puts the Treaty – through the Commis-
sion as its guardian – above the squabbles of the Member States. Although 
it is a constitutional oddity not to give a parliament a shared right of initia-
tive, this construction survived the latest round of high-level constitutional 
change (Article 17 section 2 Treaty on European Union). But also here, the 
European Parliament is using «insignificant» procedures to forge a change 
in constitutional dynamics, questioning the legitimacy and even the validity 
of the regulatory option chosen from the RIA by the European Commission 
as it has done with the Thematic Strategy on Air Quality. 
Accountability through other means than democratic representation is 
the related and last relevant constitutional category we discuss. The level of 
transparency and the public nature of the EU impact assessment process are 
up for debate. The Commission is involved in a sophisticated game of give 
and take when it comes to the openness of the process. On the one hand, the 
RIA is published only when the proposal is agreed by the college of Com-
missioners, but it is prepared in a context in which the DGs are open to the 
stakeholders though a variety of consultation techniques. There has been a 
constant push from the American side to increase the transparency of the RIA 
process – for instance by structurally publishing draft RIA reports. In some 
Member States there is confusion as to whether the preparation of the RIA 
is yet another opportunity to make the interests of the Member States heard, 
to produce counter-RIAs, or to respond to domestic pressure groups that feel 
harmed by the proposal of the Commission. 
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There is nothing similar in the USA, where consultation takes places on 
the basis of RIA rather than as an input into the analytical process. Because 
the constitutional essence is influence and discipline, the preparation of the 
RIA mainly involves OMB-OIRA and the agency. Once the agency has gone 
through the OMB hurdles, and both parties (OMB and agency) feel that the 
analysis has been concluded, then the proposed regulation is published for 
notice and comment. This is the state where the RIA becomes open to the 
stakeholders. During the preparation of the RIA, OIRA does not make the 
documents public or invite participation (Strauss et al. 2008). The fact that 
the process becomes public at a later stage in the USA also explains why 
consultation is more political in Washington and more technical in Brus-
sels. Strauss et al. (2008, 79) explain that in America «a centrally managed, 
multi-year process of consultation during the drafting process, organized by 
those responsible for drafting and not by those who hope to influence them 
politically, is simply unknown».
These differences have left a mark even in the length of documents. The 
classic American RIA is long and detailed, but the actual rule is rather short. In 
the EU, we find long directives and (relatively) short RIAs. This is not trivial. 
It alerts on an important consequence of the four major differences about 
the role of internal accountability in the USA and the external accountability 
concerns of the Commission. For the Commission, the RIA process exists to 
trigger transparency and communication. Impact assessment is above all a 
method to structure the relationship with the stakeholders for an organiza-
tion that works primarily via consensus-building. Short RIAs are useful for 
communication purposes – but the overall legislative quality of long directives 
can be questioned. In the USA, the long RIAs serve the purpose of internal 
accountability, that is, accountability of the agency to the President via OIRA. 
The balance between various types of accountability is also revealed 
by the choices made about oversight bodies – that is, the constitutional role 
of the regulatory quality «custodian». In the USA the role of this custodian 
– arguably the President – is clear: to ensure that delegated legislation is in 
line with his political priorities. In the EU, the Impact Assessment Board, 
which is more like an interim custodian endowed with soft power but the 
main custodian in practice nonetheless, has an ambivalent role (Wiener and 
Alemanno 2010). It needs to balance the needs of the institution it is part of 
(the Commission) to justify its proposals with the calls for objective analysis 
from legislative stakeholders who cannot achieve this ex post in a court room. 
It is typical of the way the EU is governed that such a pivotal organization 
(the IAB) is established on a whim, with no one except a handful of «better 
regulation experts» realizing its existence.
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6. Conclusions
This article has contributed to the comparative debate on the USA and the 
EU by drawing on a conceptual framework of regulatory constitutionalism 
originating in socio-legal studies and political science. We have shown that 
while the grand constitutional debate of the last decade has been dominated 
by the issues concerning a possible constitution for Europe and the TFEU, a 
quiet constitutional change was under way in the field of rulemaking. 
To understand this process of change, it was useful to contrast the EU 
with the US case considering classic dilemmas posed by the politics of (post)
delegation. Our analysis shows that the institutionalization of smart regulation 
has proceeded through different mechanisms in the two cases. The effects of 
regulatory change on constitutional politics also differ, at least in four impor-
tant categories. We have argued that the constitutional effects of regulatory 
oversight really do depend on issues that may prima facie seem details when 
compared to large-scale Treaty change. Perhaps regulatory procedures are 
anticipating constitutional movements that the EU is not quite ready for. In 
short, our findings add new dimensions for the analysis of two regulatory states 
that are similar at the level of the most abstract principles, but seem to differ 
when looked at from the perspective of rulemaking procedures.
Our findings have direct implications for those who do comparative 
research on constitutional issues. Regulatory oversight mechanisms have been 
«retrofitted» to the American constitutional framework. But RIA procedures 
are gradually shaping up (and often heating-up!) constitutional issues that up 
until now have been too difficult to settle at the formal constitutional level in 
the EU. These issues revolve around the constitutional values of the adminis-
trative state, institutional balance, the executive function, and accountability. 
These dimensions provide future research with a set of new conceptual hooks 
to grasp the relationship between constitutionalism and regulation.
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